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Abstract: The idea that there is a uniformly “optimal” governance structure for corporations 
features prominently in current debates and policy proposals. In this paper, we propose a 
different, constitutional theory of corporate governance: the criterion for a good corporate 
governance structure is whether it is freely chosen by the shareholders. We illustrate our 
approach by comparing the constitutional rights of shareholders under US corporate law and 
Swiss corporate law. Moreover, we discuss the mandatory provisions that shareholders would 
likely include in corporate law at a constitutional stage, behind the veil of ignorance. (91 words) 
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1. Introduction 
The recent wave of corporate scandals has sparked an intense interest in the governance of 
business firms. Academic research on corporate governance is burgeoning, and policy makers as 
well as the general public continue to debate how corporate governance could be improved. Most 
of the current thinking on corporate governance is characterized by the view that there is a 
uniformly “optimal” governance structure for corporations. It features prominently in recent 
regulatory changes like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which imposes uniform regulations to move 
corporations closer to a more adequate governance structure. It also features in the “codes of best 
practice” of many countries, which have been formulated as a guidance for corporations how to 
improve their governance. But also practitioner circles and academic researchers often explicitly 
or implicitly subscribe to the view that there is an “optimal” governance structure for firms. 
Investors increasingly rely on corporate governance indices, such as provided by the US 
Institutional Shareholder Service, to rank corporations according to an “objective” corporate 
governance quality. Financial analysts apply similar “box ticking” approaches to determine the 
valuations of corporations. In doing so, they can base their judgments on a considerable body of 
academic research that has recently tried to uncover the relationship between different corporate 
governance structures and firm valuations (although with differing results, see e.g. Gompers, Ishii 
and Metrick 2003, Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell 2004, Brown and Caylor 2004, Daily, Dalton and 
Cannella 2003). 
In this paper, we propose a completely different approach to corporate governance, which we 
term “constitutional”. In this view, there is no uniformly “optimal” governance structure for 
corporations; rather, the criterion for a “good” corporate governance structure is whether it is 
freely chosen by the shareholders. Such a constitutional choice of shareholders can operate at two 
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levels. First, within the context of a given corporate law, shareholders may be granted more or 
less constitutional rights to change the governance structure of a firm (embodied, for example, in 
the corporate charter or the articles of incorporation). The extent of these constitutional rights 
largely determines whether shareholders can institute a corporate governance system according to 
their preferences. Second, at the level of corporate law, current and potential shareholders may 
deliberate behind a “veil of ignorance” which provisions they would include as mandatory in 
corporate law and which issues they would leave to individual shareholder constituencies of 
firms. We discuss that shareholders would likely favor a corporate law that gives shareholders 
extended constitutional rights (including some influence over specific business decisions), while 
providing uniform regulations in some areas to ensure that shareholders preferences are properly 
transformed into corporate decisions and that minority shareholder interests are protected. 
In order to illustrate our approach, we compare the corporate laws of the United States and 
Switzerland. US corporate law gives shareholders relatively few direct constitutional rights. Most 
corporate governance changes have to be initiated by the board, and if shareholders e.g. wish to 
change firm’s charter or state of incorporation, they can only do so by electing a (new) board that 
will act according to their wishes (Bebchuk 2005, 2006). In contrast to this representative 
democratic approach, Swiss corporate law grants shareholders extensive constitutional rights; 
they can basically change a firm’s constitution at any general meeting. Shareholders thus have 
ample possibilities to install a corporate governance structure according to their wishes. From a 
constitutional point of view, this characteristic makes Swiss corporate law preferable over US 
corporate law. It is thereby immaterial what governance structure shareholders actually opt for in 
specific cases. The constitutional theory of corporate governance makes no inferences, for 
example, about the undesirability of staggered boards or the advantages of independent audit 
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committees. What is important is that shareholders have the constitutional possibilities to install 
or abolish these governance elements as they see fit. 
Of course, a corporate law that would leave all corporate governance decisions to shareholders’ 
discretion would likely be impracticable. The constitutions of particular firms are embedded 
within the larger framework of corporate law, and it is thus interesting to think about the 
mandatory provisions that shareholders (and other stakeholders) would write into superordinate 
corporate law at a constitutional stage, behind a veil of ignorance. An analysis of such a 
constitutional choice can be based on insights from constitutional economics, which has 
investigated the choice of rules in the political sphere (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, Frey 1983, 
Mueller 1996, Cooter 2000). We draw an analogy to this literature and show that the relevant 
concepts can also be meaningfully applied to the analysis of corporate law at a constitutional 
stage. While it is difficult to determine how such a corporate law would exactly look like, the 
analysis points out that it would likely grant extended constitutional rights to shareholder 
constituencies of specific corporations. 
To our knowledge, there are no studies in the literature so far that have approached corporate 
governance from a constitutional perspective. A few authors have applied a constitutional 
framework to the theory of the firm, most notably Gifford (1991), Vanberg (1992), Wolff (1997), 
Kaisla (2001) and Romme (2004). However, these authors do not use their analyses to address 
problems of corporate governance. Other researchers, e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach (2006), have 
taken a “contractarian” view on corporate governance, investigating the limits of state regulation, 
but they do not specifically analyze the constitutional rights of shareholders as a precondition for 
successful “private contracting”. Closest to the approach proposed here is the work by Bebchuk 
(2005, 2006), who has argued that shareholders in the United States should be given more 
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freedom to make “rules-of-the-game” decisions (i.e. constitutional rights). While being 
complementary to Bebchuk’s analysis, our approach proposes the constitutional view as a 
general, unified perspective to analyze problems of corporate governance. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the constitutional approach to corporate 
governance. It sets out the theoretical basis of the approach, describes the resulting criteria to 
evaluate corporate governance systems, illustrates the approach by comparing US corporate law 
to Swiss corporate law, and discusses some analogies to constitutional rights in the political 
sector. Section 3 analyses the constitutional choice of corporate law at a higher level, behind the 
veil of ignorance. In section 4, counterarguments against a constitutional theory of corporate 
governance are discussed. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Constitutional Approach to Corporate Governance 
2.1. Theoretical perspective 
The debate on corporate governance has been dominated by the view that there is an “optimal” 
corporate governance structure that corporations should aspire to. On the one hand, this view has 
been prominent in the academic discourse. For example, principal-agent theory has argued for the 
introduction of more pay-for-performance incentives for top managers (Jensen and Murphy 
1990), or management theory has intensively debated about the perils or advantages of CEO-
Chairman duality (Dalton et al. 1998). On the other hand, the view also features prominently in 
policy proposals on corporate governance reform (Hertig 2005) and in practitioners’ views of 
corporate governance. For example, investors are increasingly demanding corporate governance 
rankings that “objectively” rate corporations according to their governance quality (Koehn and 
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Ueng 2005). A prominent index in this respect is provided by the US Institutional Shareholder 
Service, which ranks corporations based on 63 criteria, ranging from board composition to 
management compensation and director education (ISS 2006). 
Interestingly, the focus on a uniformly optimal governance structure is not implied by the most 
important approach in the debate from a scientific point of view, principal-agent theory (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976, Shleifer and Vishny1997, Daily, Dalton and Canella 2003). Principal-agent 
theory analyzes the conflict of interest between principals (shareholders) and agents 
(management), and it assumes that a well-functioning market for corporate control will find 
different mechanisms to alleviate the resulting agency costs (though never fully eliminate them). 
In principle, each firm should find a governance structure that is well suited to its particular 
agency problems, consisting e.g. of different degrees of performance pay for executives or 
different structures of the board. However, principal-agent theory has rarely addressed the 
question to what extent principals can actually install a governance structure according to their 
wishes. For example, a crucial question is: Who, in actual fact, has the right to decide on whether 
a firm is taken over, a board is given a new structure, or a pay-for-performance plan is 
introduced? 
The constitutional approach to corporate governance puts this question at the core of analysis. 
Shareholders can in principle have different rights to change the governance structure of a firm. 
These rights are usually defined by superordinate corporate law and cannot be easily altered by 
individual shareholder constituencies (without re-incorporating the firm in a different 
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jurisdiction).1 Thus, corporate law importantly shapes the decision rights of shareholders in 
corporate matters. 
The constitutional rights of shareholders in principle cover two different classes of decisions. 
First, there are “constitutional” decisions, i.e. decisions to change the corporate charter or articles 
of incorporation (they also have been called “rules-of-the-game” decisions by Bebchuk 2005, 
2006). Second, there are specific business decisions, which cover the decision to merge or 
dissolve a company, to change the capital structure of the firm, or to pay out dividends, but which 
may also include issues such as determining the compensation structure for top management or 
the design of corporate social responsibility programs. Different corporate laws grant 
shareholders different rights regarding these constitutional and specific business decisions. This 
largely determines whether shareholders can institute a corporate governance system according to 
their preferences. Therefore, the constitutional theory of corporate governance puts the 
constitutional rights of shareholders at the centre of analysis. 
By emphasizing shareholders’ rights, the constitutional approach takes into account that the 
environments in which firms operate often change rapidly and in unpredictable ways. It is 
difficult, if not impossible, to predict which industries and markets will be dominant in the future, 
how corporations will have to adapt their organization and governance structures to the new 
environment, and what the preferences of the then shareholder constituencies will be. As a 
consequence, there is no “optimal” governance structure that is perfectly adapted to all current 
                                                
1 This is also the main reason why the market for corporate control will not automatically lead to efficient corporate 
governance structures. If the same corporate law applies to all firms in a jurisdiction, they can differentiate their 
governance structures only to a limited extent, because some elements are regulated by law. Of course, there is also 
competition between different jurisdictions providing corporate law (e.g. among the US states). However, it has been 
argued that this market for corporate law is not functioning well enough to take shareholders’ preferences fully into 
account (for a survey, see e.g. Bar-Gill, Barzuza and Bebchuk 2006). 
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and future contingencies. In contrast, the constitutional perspective takes a rules-based view, by 
stressing shareholders’ constitutional possibilities to install or abolish governance elements as 
they see fit in a dynamic environment. 
 
2.2. Criteria for a “good” corporate governance system 
The focus of the constitutional approach on rights, rather than on specific governance outcomes, 
implies very different criteria to assess the “quality” of a corporate governance structure than 
other approaches. There is a single criterion: A corporate governance structure is preferable over 
another if shareholders have more rights to (at least potentially) decide over it. Other criteria are 
not relevant from a constitutional point of view. In particular, it is immaterial whether 
shareholders actually choose governance structures that are currently seen as desirable (e.g. 
abolishment of staggered boards, more independent board members). It is also unimportant 
whether the chosen governance structures actually lead to higher firm valuations. The only 
essential element is whether shareholders have constitutional possibilities to install or abolish 
governance elements as they see fit. (There are some restrictions that shareholders and other 
stakeholders would set behind a veil of ignorance, and we will discuss these restrictions in 
sections 3 and 4 below). 
The focus on constitutional rights stands in the economic tradition to take individual preferences 
as the only standard of valuation. As a consequence, the constitutional approach shares the 
theoretical foundation with e.g. principal-agent theory, which puts shareholders’ preferences at 
the centre of analysis (Jensen and Meckling 1976), or constitutional economics or public choice, 
which employs citizens’ preferences as the standard of evaluation in the political sphere (Frey 
1978, Mueller 2003). To illustrate the importance of this methodological foundation, consider the 
  
 
8 
statement made above that firm valuation is no criterion to assess the quality of a governance 
structure from a constitutional point of view. While most shareholders may indeed only care 
about share prices, it would be a far too narrow view of shareholders’ preferences to assume that 
all investors are exclusively interested in monetary returns (for evidence, see e.g. Moskowitz and 
Vissing-Jorgensen 2002). There may be groups of shareholders who are willing to pay a price, 
for example, for a particularly sensible corporate social responsibility program or for 
environmentally friendly production. Similarly, shareholders may have a preference for certain 
governance structures even if this lowers share price. Assessing these governance structures 
based on firm valuations alone would falsely characterize them as “inadequate” if shareholders 
actually had the constitutional right to freely install them at a particular firm. 
If constitutional rights are the sole criterion to evaluate corporate governance structures from a 
constitutional point of view, what is the standard to classify constitutional rights as “superior” 
and “inferior”? A simple rule is to define a set of constitutional rights as preferable over another 
if it restricts shareholders’ actual or potential possibilities to express their preferences to a lesser 
extent. The terms “actual or potential” indicate that shareholders need not always decide over a 
corporate matter from the constitutional point of view. For example, most shareholders will 
prefer to delegate the setting of management compensation to the board most of the time. But 
shareholders may or may not have the right to decide whether they want to have a say over this 
corporate matter or whether they rather want to delegate it. This “choice whether to have a 
choice” is important, as it serves as a credible threat even if shareholders do not in fact decide 
over a specific matter. 
The criteria presented can be applied to rights regarding all constitutional or specific business 
decisions in corporations, ranging from the choice of how to structure the board to the 
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determination of a corporate social responsibility policy. The constitutional approach to corporate 
governance is illustrated in the following by comparing US corporate law and Swiss corporate 
law. 
 
2.3. A comparison of US and Swiss corporate law 
The corporate laws of the United States and Switzerland are interesting to compare, because they 
grant shareholders very different degrees of constitutional rights in corporate matters. The US 
corporate law can be characterized as a “representative democratic system”. It does not grant 
shareholders the right to directly initiate corporate governance changes or to propose specific 
business decisions; rather, the respective decision authority is vested in the board (e.g. Kraakman 
et al. 2004, Blair and Stout 1999, 2001, Bebchuk 2005, 2006). If shareholders wish to initiate 
changes in the governance structure of a firm, they can essentially only do so by electing a (new) 
board that agrees to submit the desired changes to a shareholder vote. Thus, shareholders have no 
possibility to induce corporate governance changes against a board’s preferences. In contrast, 
Swiss corporate law is considerably more “direct democratic” (for overviews, see Forstmoser, 
Meier-Hayoz and Nobel 1996, Becchio et al. 1996). Shareholders are granted extensive 
constitutional rights to initiate changes of the constitution of the firm and to propose specific 
business decisions. There is no need for shareholders to elect a new board; rather, changes can be 
proposed directly and the existing board can be mandated to execute them. It is convenient to 
illustrate these differences between US and Swiss corporate law using four examples, two 
concerning constitutional decisions and two concerning specific business decisions. 
Abolishment of staggered boards. The structure of the corporate board is a crucial element of the 
constitution of the firm. For example, the term lengths of the members of the board are specified 
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in the corporate charter / bylaws in the United States or in the articles of incorporation in 
Switzerland. The corporate laws of both countries permit term lengths of more than one year, 
which creates the potential problem of staggered boards: If the term length is e.g. three years, 
only a third of all directors can be removed from the board in a given year. Shareholders in the 
United States have found it to be very difficult to repeal staggered boards (by shortening the term 
lengths of directors), because such a change in the firm’s constitution has to be brought forward 
by the board itself (Bebchuk 2005: 851-856). Conversely, shareholders of Swiss firms have the 
right to directly propose a respective change of the articles of incorporation. A binding 
shareholder vote to abolish a staggered board can be requested by any shareholder or shareholder 
group holding more than 1 Mio. CHF of share capital or 10 percent of the shares (Swiss Code of 
Obligations §699.3; Forstmoser, Meier-Hayoz and Nobel 1996: §23, N27). Thus, Swiss corporate 
law grants shareholders an extended constitutional right to express their preferences over the 
structure of the board. 
Direct election of the chairman. Another constitutional element that has been much debated in 
the literature is the separation between the chairman of the board and the CEO (Dalton et al. 
1998). Under US corporate law, the corporate charter or bylaws specify the procedure to elect the 
chairman of the board, and it is generally the board’s duty to appoint one of its members for this 
position (Delaware General Corporate Law §142, Model Business Corporation Act §8.40). As 
changes of the charter / bylaws have to be initiated by the board, shareholders’ possibilities to 
install a different election system are severely limited. This makes it difficult to install a 
separation of the chairman / CEO position against the board’s preferences. In contrast, Swiss 
corporate law explicitly grants shareholders the right to change the constitution of the firm such 
that they can directly elect the chairman of the board (Swiss Code of Obligations §712.2). 
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Shareholders of Swiss companies thus possess the constitutional right to request a direct election 
of the chairman if they see this as an important element to improve the governance of a firm. 
Dividends. With respect to specific business decisions, the distribution of dividends constitutes an 
important element. Dividends transfer assets from the corporation to shareholders. Thus, they 
play a role in determining the “size” of a corporation and in alleviating potential agency 
problems, such as empire building by managers or misuse of free cash flow. US corporate law 
puts the decision whether to pay out a dividend and of what amount into the board’s discretion, 
unless the corporate charter provides otherwise (Delaware General Corporate Law §170, Model 
Business Corporation Act §6.40). As in the cases discussed above, shareholders do not have the 
right to initiate changes of the corporate charter and thus cannot install a specific dividend payout 
policy (Bebchuk 2005: 901-903). Swiss corporate law regulates the distribution of dividends 
differently. Shareholders have the right to freely specify how the corporate profit is used, i.e. 
whether it is (partly) distributed in the form of dividends or whether it is added to the corporate 
assets (Swiss Code of Obligations §698.2, Forstmoser, Meier-Hayoz and Nobel 1996: §22, N41-
48). Under Swiss corporate law, shareholders thus have extended constitutional rights to 
influence the distribution of corporate assets. 
Management compensation. An even more specific business decision is the choice of how to 
compensate the top managers of a firm. However, the structure of management compensation is 
generally regarded as an important element of corporate governance in the literature (e.g. Jensen 
and Murphy 1990, Dalton et al. 2003, Frey and Osterloh 2005). US corporate law treats the 
decision of whether managers should receive strong performance-related pay (e.g. in the form of 
stock and stock options) or rather more fixed compensation as a normal business affair and 
therefore assigns the respective decision rights to the board (Delaware General Corporate Law 
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§141, Model Business Corporation Act §6.40). Under current Swiss corporate law, the setting of 
management compensation is also considered as one of the inalienable duties of the corporate 
board (Swiss Code of Obligations §716a, Forstmoser, Meier-Hayoz and Nobel 1996: §30, N31). 
Thus, shareholders of Swiss corporations do not enjoy extended constitutional rights with respect 
to this specific business decision; they also do not have the “choice whether to have a choice” 
over the matter. However, a current reform of Swiss corporate law plans to introduce a respective 
constitutional right for shareholders, with the aim to move compensation practices closer to 
shareholders’ preferences. 
In sum, US and Swiss corporate law widely differ with respect to the constitutional rights they 
grant to shareholder constituencies of particular firms. The analysis demonstrates that the 
constitutional rights of shareholders under Swiss law are very extensive, vesting them with large 
discretion to initiate corporate governance changes and specific business decisions. In contrast to 
this “direct democratic” approach, US corporate law reserves most decision rights to the elected 
representatives of shareholders, the members of the corporate board. It has been argued that this 
constitutes one of the core strengths of the US corporate system, because it locks in capital to the 
firm and protects stakeholders from opportunistic behavior by shareholders (see e.g. Blair and 
Stout 1999, 2001, Hansmann and Kraakman 2004a). Contrary to this view, the constitutional 
approach to corporate governance suggests that extended constitutional rights for shareholders 
are desirable, as exemplified by Swiss corporate law. While counterarguments against the 
constitutional perspective will be discussed in detail in section 4, it shall suffice here to mention 
that Swiss corporate law has not led to the negative results that may be expected from a critical 
point of view. Firms incorporated in Switzerland seem to be quite successful in attracting 
investors, creditors, employees and customers and consequently are among the largest 
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corporations worldwide, e.g. in the banking, insurance, pharmaceutical and food sectors. 
Moreover, stock market capitalization relative to GDP is very high in Switzerland (about 65 
percent higher than in the United States; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 2000), and there are 
essentially no serious conflicts between shareholders and other stakeholders like employees 
(Monger 2004). 
 
2.4. Analogy to direct democracy vs. representative democracy in politics 
The constitutional rights of shareholders stand in close analogy to the constitutional rights that 
citizens have in the political sphere (see also Benz and Frey 2006, Frey and Benz 2005). Citizens’ 
rights to participate in political decisions are a crucial characteristic of any democratic 
constitution. In representative democracies, they typically comprise the right to vote in elections 
and to run for a seat in parliament, and in direct democracies, they additionally entail possibilities 
of launching and voting on referenda and initiatives. Political science and public choice theory 
routinely classify political constitutions as “direct democracies” or “representative democracies”, 
in a similar way as the constitutional rights of shareholders can be classified into “representative 
democratic” and “direct democratic” systems. It thus seems interesting to shortly highlight how 
extended constitutional rights of citizens in the political sphere affect the governance of political 
entities. 
While there is some disagreement about the relative merits of direct democracy, a growing body 
of empirical studies suggests that extended constitutional rights allow citizens to install public 
policies that are closer to their preferences (for extensive surveys, see Matsusaka 2005, Frey and 
Stutzer 2006). According to the evidence, direct democratic rights help citizens to alleviate 
similar agency problems as those existing in the corporate sector. For example, citizens with 
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more direct democratic rights are more successful in restricting “empire building” by politicians 
(i.e. excessive expansion of government size), and they are able to more effectively align 
government activity with their interests. This suggests that extended constitutional rights of 
principals are not only important in corporate sphere, but that they also play an essential role in 
solving principal-agent problems in politics. 
 
3. The Choice of Corporate Law at the Constitutional Stage 
The analysis so far has considered the constitutional rights that shareholders are granted within a 
given corporate law. However, such an analysis is necessarily incomplete. Corporate law cannot 
simply devolve all constitutional rights to the individual shareholder constituencies of 
corporations; rather, it has to provide a set of basic mandatory rules to make the law functional 
(Hansmann and Kraakman 2004b). As a consequence, there are necessary limits to the 
constitutional rights that shareholders may enjoy. We have argued that these limits may be drawn 
relatively wide, without obvious dysfunctional consequences. Nevertheless, it seems important to 
think about the mandatory rules that corporate law ought to specify.  
In this section, we argue that the constitutional approach can also provide a novel perspective on 
the question of mandatory provisions in corporate law. The constitutional view proposes the “veil 
of ignorance” as the criterion to assess generally binding rules (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 
Rawls 1971, Frey 1983, Mueller 1996): What corporate law would individuals agree upon if they 
were behind a veil of ignorance, i.e. if they were not aware of their position and specific interests 
as shareholders, potential shareholders, employees or other stakeholders? While the veil of 
ignorance clearly is a hypothetical construct, it can nevertheless offer a fruitful perspective. In 
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particular, corporate law is not taken as given, but it is analyzed how individuals would likely 
design corporate law and important corporate governance provisions at a constitutional stage. 
Of course, applying the constitutional view to all relevant aspects of corporate law lies far beyond 
the scope of the present paper. Corporate law has many essential features that are common to the 
corporation laws of most developed countries, e.g. the concepts of legal personality, limited 
liability or the transferability of shares (for a survey, see Kraakman et al. 2004). The following 
analysis will be limited to the much narrower question of shareholders’ constitutional rights in 
matters of corporate governance. The focus thus is on individuals’ choice of constitutional rights 
at a constitutional stage, without knowledge about their positions and interests when the rights 
actually will be applied. 
 
3.1. Constitutional rights behind a veil of ignorance 
The field of constitutional economics, which has investigated the choice of rules in the political 
sphere, has developed a major principle for how individuals would rationally set rules behind the 
veil of ignorance. The core idea is that collective decision-making always entails a trade-off 
between “decision-making costs” and “externality costs” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; see also 
Romme 2004, Marino and Matsusaka 2005 for applications to business organizations). Decision-
making costs emerge because it takes time and resources to reach a collective agreement. If a 
collective decision has to be approved by a large majority of individuals (in the extreme, by 
unanimity), it entails high decision-making costs, while a collective decision that has to be 
supported only by a simple majority entails lower decision-making costs. In contrast, externality 
costs are inversely related to the level of the majority required for a collective decision. A 
unanimity rule ensures that collective decisions never impose an externality on an individual, 
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because otherwise the individual would not approve the collective decision. Conversely, a simple 
majority rule entails higher externality costs, as in this case a majority can impose its preferences 
on a minority. Depending on the shape and the magnitude of decision-making and externality 
costs, there are different levels of “optimal” majority requirements for collective decisions. Thus, 
the constitutional approach focuses on the fundamental trade-off between the agreement costs 
and the externality costs that a collective decision involves. 
Unanimity and mandatory provisions. A first application of the constitutional approach concerns 
the question of unanimity: Behind the veil of ignorance, for which corporate decisions would 
individuals require a unanimity approval of all shareholders and stakeholders? According to the 
constitutional view, this could either be the case because decision-making costs are very low or 
because externality costs are very high. For example, at the constitutional stage individuals may 
consider the situation of creditors. A large externality is imposed on creditors if shareholders 
decide to distribute the firm’s assets without satisfying creditors’ claims. Individuals may thus 
consider a unanimity rule for the decision to liquidate a firm, requiring approval of all 
shareholders and creditors. But a unanimity rule also would lead to very high decision-making 
costs. Therefore, individuals may rather opt for a mandatory provision, requiring that 
corporations fulfill their contractual obligations before any assets can be distributed. In fact, this 
is the rule contained in essentially all corporate law codes of developed countries (Hertig and 
Kanda 2004). Corporate law sets mandatory provisions in other areas where potential 
externalities are high and unanimity rules would lead to high decision-making costs. From a 
constitutional point of view, this is likely to reflect provisions that individuals would adopt 
behind a veil of ignorance. 
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Supermajority requirements and minority protection. An application more closely related to 
corporate governance is the question of majority requirements for shareholder decisions. Even if 
no externalities are imposed on other stakeholders, the trade-off between decision-making costs 
and externality costs is still relevant. For example, the major corporate governance problem in 
many countries is not the conflict between shareholders and management, but the problem that 
majority shareholders can exploit minority shareholders (e.g. Djankov et al. 2005). Individuals 
who consider, behind the veil of ignorance, the potential externalities that majority shareholders 
can impose on minority investors will devise adequate rules to address this conflict of interest. 
One rule they are likely to adopt are supermajority requirements for shareholder decisions where 
externalities are most prevalent. Typically, those decisions would include changes in the firm’s 
constitution and other important specific business decisions. In fact, the corporate laws of many 
countries require that the most important corporate decisions be approved not by a majority, but 
by a supermajority of shareholders. This is particularly the case in countries where shareholders 
are granted extensive constitutional rights and thus majority shareholders have large potential 
possibilities to exploit minority investors. Swiss corporate law, for example, requires that certain 
changes in the articles of incorporation be approved by 66 percent of shareholders (Swiss Code 
of Obligations §704), and UK corporate law prescribes an even higher supermajority requirement 
of 75 percent (Bebchuk 2005: 848). Individuals might also reasonably agree behind a veil of 
ignorance to other mandatory rules serving to protect minority shareholders, many of which form 
a common body of corporate law in developed countries (e.g. the rule of pro-rata distribution of 
dividends, Hansmann and Kraakman 2004a: 54-61). 
Delegation of constitutional rights to the board. Would individuals decide behind the veil of 
ignorance to reserve extended constitutional rights for shareholders or to delegate many decision-
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making powers to the corporate board? The question again is one of trading off decision-making 
costs and externality costs. Extended constitutional rights would likely entail high decision-
making costs for shareholders, but they would also lower the probability that externalities are 
imposed on them as a result of misguided board decisions. It is open whether individuals would 
adopt a mandatory rule at a constitutional stage that uniformly regulates the division of power 
between shareholders and the board. However, it seems more likely that individuals would leave 
this decision to the shareholder constituencies of particular firms. There is no obvious reason why 
the trade-off between decision-making costs and externality costs could not be assessed by the 
shareholder constituencies of particular firms, given that there are no externalities on other parties 
(see also section 4 on externalities). Different shareholder constituencies would likely adopt 
different governance arrangements, depending on the specific trade-off at a particular firm. If 
decision-making costs are high or externality costs are low, shareholder constituencies would 
probably opt for a more delegated structure, while in case of low decision-making costs or high 
externality costs, they would choose more direct involvement in decision-making. Individuals 
behind the veil of ignorance are therefore unlikely to strongly restrict the constitutional rights of 
shareholders in corporate law. Rather, they would probably opt for a shareholder right to “choose 
whether to have a choice”, i.e. to decide whether a corporate issue is delegated to the board or 
whether it is dealt with by shareholders themselves. There seems to be no reason to assume a 
priori that this constitutional right of shareholders could not include decisions such as setting the 
structure of management compensation or designing corporate social responsibility policies. 
However, as argued above, individuals would presumably subject proposed changes in the 
governance and delegation structure of a firm to a supermajority requirement in order to protect 
minority shareholders. 
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Ensuring shareholder representation. Behind the veil of ignorance, individuals may also consider 
rules that govern the most basic aspect of shareholder rights, namely the question of who should 
be entitled to vote in collective shareholder decisions. Individuals would probably not devise a 
rule that would force shareholders to vote or deprive them of the possibility of transferring their 
voting right to other parties, but they would likely conceive rules to ensure that those entitled to 
vote actually vote in the interest of the ultimate beneficiaries (for a similar argument, see 
Easterbrook and Fischel 1991). Two current issues related to shareholders’ voting rights would 
probably attract individuals’ interest behind a veil of ignorance: First, the practice of delegated 
voting by institutional investors or pension funds, and second, the practice of securities lending. 
Both practices entail the problem that those voting in actual shareholder decisions are not, or only 
indirectly, the beneficiaries of the actions decided upon. In case of delegated voting by 
institutional investors or pension funds, there is a governance problem of its own, as the 
representatives of funds might follow their own interests rather than those of the ultimate 
beneficiaries (e.g. Woidtke 2002, Gillan and Starks 2003). The practice of securities lending 
entails the problem that voting rights can fall in the hands of individuals who are only very short-
term economic beneficiaries, or who specifically borrow shares to influence voting results 
(Christoffersen et al. 2005); in addition, multiple voting rights may be created for a single share 
(Martin and Partnoy 2005). Individuals might consider rules behind the veil of ignorance to 
ensure the correct representation of shareholders’ preferences in corporate decisions. For 
example, they could consider a mandatory rule that delegated voting is only permitted if the 
delegate has obtained approval for his voting strategy from the ultimate beneficiaries (this is 
essentially the rule, for example, in Swiss corporate law; Forstmoser, Meier-Hayoz and Nobel 
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1996). Similarly, shares that are lent out might be mandated not to convey a voting right to the 
borrower (Martin and Partnoy 2005). 
In sum, the constitutional approach to corporate law sheds an alternative perspective on existing 
corporation law and corporate governance practices. In some cases, applying the thought 
experiment of the veil of ignorance results in conclusions that are very similar to what is actually 
practiced in the corporate laws of many countries nowadays, e.g. with respect to the protection of 
creditors or minority shareholders. In other cases, the constitutional perspective tends to favor the 
corporate laws of some countries over others, e.g. with respect to the allocation of decision rights 
between the board and shareholders. In still other cases, the constitutional approach can only 
offer tentative guidance for how corporate law should proceed, e.g. with regard to current issues 
such as delegated voting or securities lending. 
 
4. Counterarguments Against a Constitutional Theory of Corporate Governance 
The constitutional approach to corporate governance can be criticized along several dimensions, 
some of which have already been discussed in the previous section. In the following, three main 
counterarguments shall be addressed in more detail. First, it can be argued that extended 
constitutional rights for shareholders would hurt the interests of other stakeholders, like 
employees. Second, it can be objected that shareholders would in fact profit from a full 
delegation of decision-making powers to the board, because this credibly “ties the owner’s 
hands”. And third, extended constitutional rights may be seen as misguided because shareholders 
have weak incentives to be informed about corporate decisions and to participate in them. 
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4.1. Shareholders vs. other stakeholders 
The first counterargument against extended constitutional rights for shareholders makes the case 
that several agency problems exist within a corporation. There is a well-known agency problem 
between shareholders and management, and extended constitutional rights may help to alleviate 
it, but there are also other agency problems, such as the conflict between shareholders and 
employees (e.g. Hansmann and Kraakman 2004b, Blair and Stout 1999, 2001). An important 
function of corporate law is to protect employees (and other stakeholders) from opportunistic 
behavior by shareholders. As has been discussed in the previous section, the main instrument for 
achieving this is to provide legal protection to the contracts that employees and creditors engage 
in with the corporation. 
From a theoretical point of view, however, there are other reasons why externalities may be 
imposed on stakeholders, even if they are protected by contract. In particular, this is the case if 
stakeholders make firm-specific investments. For example, employees may suffer a considerable 
externality if they have invested in firm-specific human capital and the employment relationship 
is terminated. The externality in this case consists of the foregone value of firm-specific 
investments to employees, which by definition are only valuable inside the firm and not outside 
on the general job market. The concept of firm-specific human capital is well-established in the 
literature; moreover, it can be precisely measured by the wage reduction that employees have to 
suffer in case of an external termination of the employment relationship. While there is some 
disagreement about the empirical relevance of firm-specific human capital, several studies have 
suggested that it is responsible e.g. for the phenomenon that wages rise with the seniority of 
employees at a particular firm (see e.g. Topel 1991, Flabbi and Ichino 2001, Dostie 2005, Lazear 
2003). 
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If firm-specific human capital is relevant, employees’ interests should be given adequate 
protection in corporate governance (Furubotn 1988, Roberts and Van den Steen 2000, Osterloh 
and Frey 2005). It has been argued that it is the essential function of the corporate board to 
provide this protection (e.g. Blair and Stout 1999, 2001). Extended constitutional rights for 
shareholders are undesirable from this point of view, because they would seriously undermine the 
board’s possibilities to balance the different agency conflicts within the firm as a neutral 
arbitrator.  
In a constitutional perspective, however, the delegation of decision powers to the board is only 
one of many possible corporate governance arrangements that can serve to protect employees’ 
firm-specific investments. In particular, employees’ interests can also be secured by giving them 
voting rights in corporate decisions. From a constitutional point of view, corporate law should 
provide for the possibility that shareholders grant voting rights to employees. Shareholders would 
let employees participate in corporate decisions out of pure self-interest if these voting rights are 
crucial for giving employees incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital (Osterloh and 
Frey 2005). Thus, there are alternative methods to alleviate potential conflicts between 
shareholders and other stakeholders, and these methods are well compatible with extended 
constitutional rights for shareholders in corporate governance. 
 
4.2. Credible commitments: “Tying the owners’ hands” 
A second objection to a constitutional view of corporate governance argues that shareholders 
would actually benefit from not having extended rights to interfere in corporate matters. The full 
delegation of decision-making powers to the board can serve as a “credible commitment” (e.g. 
Blair 2005, Miller and Falaschetti 1999). For example, delegating the decision over the 
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distribution of corporate assets to the board credibly restrains shareholders from opportunistically 
liquidating the firm. Thereby, capital is “locked-in” into the corporation, and firm-specific 
investments by all related parties are facilitated. Extended constitutional rights for shareholders 
may undermine this function, and as a result, firm value could be reduced. 
While the role of credible commitments in corporate governance has received some attention in 
the theoretical literature, there seems to be no systematic evidence that extended constitutional 
rights for shareholders seriously impair the growth and longevity of corporations. The case of 
Swiss corporate law may again serve as an illustration. Firms incorporated in Switzerland grant 
shareholders very extensive constitutional rights in corporate matters. Nevertheless, this has not 
adversely affected their ability to attract investors, creditors, employees and customers. The stock 
market capitalization of Swiss firms relative to GDP, which can serve as a proxy measure for the 
size of the corporate sector in an economy, is among the highest in the world (2.17 in the year 
2004, compared to e.g. 1.32 in the United States; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2000). Firms 
also seem to cope well with extended shareholder rights if they are subject to fierce global 
competition, such as in the banking, insurance, pharmaceutical and food sectors, where Swiss 
firms are among the largest global corporations. Lastly, extended constitutional rights for 
shareholders have not damaged relationships between corporations and employees. Although 
there are usually no formal voting rights for employees in Swiss firms, there are strong “implicit 
contracts” that corporations will take the interests of employees into account in important 
corporate matters, which has resulted e.g. in a very low incidence of working days lost due to 
labor disputes (Monger 2004). Thus, credible commitments that “tie the owner’s hands” seem not 
to offer a major argument for denying shareholders extensive constitutional rights, at least in the 
case of Switzerland. 
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4.3. Passive shareholders 
A final and maybe the most important counterargument against the constitutional perspective on 
corporate governance concerns the problem of shareholder passivity (e.g. Black 1990). Extended 
constitutional rights for shareholders might not serve them well if they are not adequately 
informed about corporate matters and if they mostly abstain from voting in corporate decisions. 
Indeed, shareholders face only weak incentives to engage themselves in these respects. Both 
being informed and participating in corporate decisions are public goods among dispersed 
shareholder constituencies. If decision-making costs seem too high for shareholders, they may 
even agree behind the veil of ignorance to delegate most decision-making powers to the corporate 
board (cf. section 3). Is shareholder passivity thus a main impediment for extended shareholder 
rights? 
There are three arguments why this is unlikely to be the case. First, the main function of extended 
constitutional rights for shareholders is not that investors actually vote on all major corporate 
decisions, but that they have the possibility to request a vote if they see a matter as particularly 
important. This credible threat disciplines corporate boards even if shareholders never decide 
themselves over a corporate issue. For example, if a corporate board considers whether to pay out 
a dividend and of what amount, it will take shareholders’ views into account ex ante if 
shareholders can easily overturn the board’s proposal. Extended constitutional rights therefore 
deploy their effects to a large extent in an indirect way, without shareholders having to vote on a 
large number of corporate decisions. 
Second, it can be argued that shareholder passivity is not given, but that it crucially depends on 
the extent of constitutional rights granted to shareholders. In a system where all major corporate 
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decisions are in fact taken by the board, the incentives for shareholders to be informed are indeed 
quite low. In contrast, a system that grants shareholders extensive constitutional rights is likely to 
lead to better informed shareholders, because corporate boards have an incentive to become more 
active in supplying information to investors. In the political sphere, it has been shown that 
extended constitutional rights for citizens lead to higher levels of voter information in political 
matters (Benz and Stutzer 2004). 
Third, the problems of low information and low turnout levels in corporate decisions are likely to 
become less important to the extent that institutional investors’ influence in corporate governance 
increases. Institutional investors have much larger incentives to be informed about corporate 
issues and to use their voting rights, because the size of their equity holdings gives them a real 
chance to influence corporate decisions. However, the importance of institutional investors is not 
unproblematic. As has been argued in section 3, institutional investors ought to act in the interests 
of their ultimate beneficiaries, and those may in turn have low incentives to adequately control 
their delegates’ actions. 
In sum, while several counterarguments against a constitutional approach to corporate 
governance can be brought forward, they do not seem valid enough to suggest that the theoretical 
perspective proposed is inadequate or that extended constitutional rights for shareholders are 
impracticable. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has advanced an alternative approach to the governance of business firms, which we 
have termed a constitutional theory of corporate governance. The perspective departs from the 
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currently prominent notion that there is a uniformly “optimal” governance structure for 
corporations. Rather, it proposes a different, rules-based view. A corporate governance 
arrangement should be considered as adequate if shareholders have extended constitutional rights 
to (at least potentially) freely adopt and change it, and it should be considered as inadequate if 
shareholders are denied these rights. The focus on the constitutional rights of shareholders is 
relevant from a theoretical point of view as well as in corporate governance practice. For 
example, the corporate laws of the United States and Switzerland grant shareholders very 
different constitutional rights to change the firm’s constitution or to initiate specific business 
decisions, which largely determines their respective possibilities to install corporate governance 
structures according to their preferences. 
The constitutional approach to corporate governance can not only be applied to existing 
governance arrangements, it can also provide a novel perspective on the superordinate question 
what corporate law individuals would adopt at a constitutional stage, behind a veil of ignorance. 
It has been shown that in some areas, the constitutional perspective leads to conclusions that are 
very similar to what is actually practiced in corporate governance in many countries nowadays. 
Overall, there seem to be no convincing arguments that individuals would strongly restrict the 
constitutional rights of shareholders at a constitutional stage. Rather, behind the veil of ignorance, 
individuals would probably opt for a shareholder right to “choose whether to have a choice”, i.e. 
to decide whether a corporate issue is delegated to the board or whether it is dealt with by 
shareholders themselves. Moreover, they would likely subject proposed changes in the 
governance structure of a firm to a supermajority requirement in order to protect minority 
shareholders. 
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The constitutional view of corporate governance can be opposed on several grounds, and we have 
discussed counterarguments related to potential conflicts between shareholders and stakeholders, 
the necessity to credibly “lock-in” capital to the firm in order to facilitate firm-specific 
investments, and the problem of shareholder passivity. None of these counterarguments seems to 
provide a strong case against granting shareholders extended constitutional rights in matters of 
corporate governance. If the constitutional theory of corporate governance is correct, these 
extended constitutional rights for shareholders ought to make a large difference for the actual 
practice of corporate governance. This implication, however, stands to be more fully investigated 
in future work. 
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